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ABSTRACT 
 
Nuclear power has significantly improved performance over the last thirty years. This improvement 
has been based on a philosophy of control. That is, for each issue that must be managed to achieve 
safe performance, a pre-determined barrier must be established. In addition to the barriers that were 
designed into the plant, a large range of programs, processes and procedures have been developed to 
direct the activities of anyone associated with the plant. The premise is that the following of pre-
determined procedures in a diligent way will support ongoing plant safety. 
 
But what if an issue arises for which there is no procedure? For serious situations emergency 
procedures exist to guide operations personnel to place the plant in a safe state. However, the 
majority of emerging issues are much more mundane and form part of the daily life in the plant. 
Where an issue is of concern, and it is developing slowly, the nuclear power industry has been 
encouraging the use of an ‘Operational Decision Making’ (ODM) process. This process is used to 
respond rigorously to the issue, generate an appropriate procedure, and help assure ongoing safe 
operation of the plant. 
 
The purpose of this research was to look in detail at the ODM process as practiced at a large 
Canadian nuclear power utility. Semi-structured interviews of operations and engineering managers 
were used to build a consolidated picture of their lived experience as they use the ODM process to 
address unique situations. Rather than focus on the technical aspects of situations where ODM 
process is used, the interviews used the ‘technical’ story as a framework to discus the way the key 
players think through, and interact with each other, as they work through issues in a team 
environment. The resulting data provided a rich description of the ODM process as enacted by the 
participants. 
 
Research of the ODM process is of interest because it illustrates where a traditional problem solving 
and decision making process is enhanced by social interaction of the participants. The process as 
lived reaches beyond the traditional control philosophy of nuclear power to provide enhanced input 
to the decision process. However, the prevalent philosophy of control also appears to inhibit the full 
value that could be realised from the ODM process, particularly where the current focus is to fill 
gaps in the regimen of control rather than using the process to obtain a more complete 
understanding of the system as a whole. Instead of seeing an emerging issue as a challenge to the 
paradigm of control, the ODM process uses current information about the state of the system, along 
with a multi-disciplinary approach, to provide thoroughly prepared guidance to the system operators. 
This approach is already being used to respond to the on-going variations that are now 
acknowledged as part of managing a complex system. It appears that the social properties of the 
ODM process add features that help to cope with complexity in the socio-technical systems that now 
comprise nuclear power utilities.  
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INTRODUCTION – HISTORY AND THEORY 
 
The development of a ‘philosophy of control’ in nuclear power 
 
Over the last 35 years events within the nuclear power industry have had a significant impact on the 
development of the industry. Three-mile Island (1979), Chernobyl (1986) and Fukishima (2011) are 
well known publically through broad media coverage. Less well known is the event at the Davis-
Besse plant in Ohio (2002) where serious corrosion resulted in weakening of the reactor vessel, 
narrowly avoiding a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). These events all shaped the development of 
the organisations and leadership that are responsible for safe operation of the plants today. 
 
The initial focus of improvement after Three-mile Island (TMI) was ‘technical’ in nature in its 
emphasis on better equipment reliability and in improvements to training and procedures. In 
addition it was recognised that the industry had failed to learn from its own experience, and had 
managed to standards which consisted of merely satisfying regulatory requirements. The industry 
response to TMI in the USA was significant and resulted in the forming of a unique utility 
association. This organisation, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), was the focal 
point of the development of a nuclear ‘community’ which exercised a great deal of peer pressure 
over all of its members. Through this process INPO was able to lead improvements across the US 
nuclear industry by the use of a peer evaluation process, the accreditation of training programs, the 
analysis and sharing of operating experience, and providing focussed support to deal with specific 
problems at individual plants. INPO managed to establish new normative standards that expected 
ongoing pursuit of excellence rather than the mere meeting of government regulation (Rees, 1994). 
 
When INPO was first established it faced the issue that the fledgling nuclear power industry had no 
experience base from which to identify and draw upon best practices. It turned to the US nuclear 
navy where the famous Admiral Hyman Rickover had established a nuclear power submarine service 
that had an excellent safety record. Rickover had an almost prophetic view of the dangers associated 
with nuclear energy, and the need to respect both the engineering design features and the need for 
‘painstaking care’ in nuclear operations. Thus INPO hired many ex-navy personnel and used navy 
practices to provide a starting point for the rapid improvement of civilian nuclear power operations. 
As INPO and the industry matured and gained further civilian based experience, the standards to 
which INPO holds the industry accountable have become based on best practice in industry. 
However the core principles (adopted from US navy practice) of clear command structure, and 
discipline in the application of procedures, still provides a strong core philosophy within the 
industry(Perin, 2005; Rees, 1994). 
 
Then there was the Chernobyl accident. This event raised the first warning flags about the influences 
of culture on safe plant operation. The term ‘Safety Culture’ was coined by the International Atomic 
Energy Authority (IAEA) in its follow up review of the events leading up to Chernobyl (IAEA, 
1991). The prevailing attitudes and beliefs throughout the organisation which operated Chernobyl 
had created an environment where “the operators … seemed to have lost all sense of danger” 
(Legasov, as quoted in Mosey, 1990, p. 92). The nuclear industry responded with additional programs 
and procedures to reduce human error, to create a safety conscious work environment, and to 
improve the safety culture at each plant (Rogers, 2013).  
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The organisations that manage nuclear power today have grown into complex socio-technical 
endeavours. Nuclear utilities continue to be operated in a very highly structured way with great 
emphasis on organisation structure, programs, processes and procedures. Each program contains 
design and risk information, along with the desired methodology to control the risk. New issues and 
lessons learned from experience are managed by the revision of, or by the creation of, more rules 
and procedures.  The identified requirements for safety are thus embedded in the plant programs and 
procedures. Plant managers and workers are expected to assure ongoing safety by adhering 
rigorously to the procedures (Rees, 1994; Rogers, 2013). Perin further illustrates the industry’s 
thinking behind this culture of control: 
 
In this high hazard world, technologists’ explicit claims pivot around the dynamics of control 
theory, meshed with productivity concepts such as optimization and efficiency, to produce 
protective bywords such as command and control, defense in depth, feedback, margins of 
safety, procedures, rules, system reliability, training (2005, p.xii ). 
 
Ultra-safe, but is that enough? 
 
This philosophy of control for achieving safety in the nuclear power industry has been successful to 
the extent that the industry can be included in the category of ultra-safe system.  
 
Ultra-safe systems, where risk of disaster is below one accident per 100,000 or even one 
million safety units. Regularly scheduled civilian flights, railroads (in Europe) and the nuclear 
industry are examples of industries having reached this level (Amalberti, 2001, p. 111).  
 
In spite of the ultra-safety level of industry performance significant incidents have occurred, as 
illustrated by some recent examples. The event at Fukishima in Japan in March of 2011 is an example 
of a major accident. Smaller events also challenge safe operation. “The nuclear power industry world-
wide was surprised by the effects of the surge on the emergency power system…” during a serious 
operational event at the Forsmark nuclear power plant in 2006 (Sanne, 2012, p. 240). Another recent 
example occurred on March 31 in 2013 when a 500 tonne component was dropped during 
maintenance work at the shutdown ‘unit 1’ of the Arkansas Nuclear One plant. One person was 
killed and eight others were injured. Additionally, the electrical system in the adjacent ‘unit 2’ reactor 
of the plant was disturbed, resulting in an automatic shutdown from full power. An emergency state 
existed for 10 hours as operators stabilised the plant electrical system. (World Nuclear News, 2013)  
 
In order to make improvements beyond the existing performance of ultra-safe systems Amalberti 
suggests different approaches are required. This is in addition to the existing historical reliance on 
elimination of human error, improving equipment reliability, and the detailed specification of 
operator action in procedures. The need for additional diverse approaches to safety is necessary due 
to the nature of accidents being different at the ultra-safe level. For example, incidents usually do not 
result from serious breakdown or error, but are more likely to arise due to a combination of 
circumstances that are difficult to detect using the historical approach (2001).  
 
Traditional safety approaches rely on a linear approach that establishes a cause for every effect, and 
designs a barrier by way of physical plant, automation, or procedure, to avoid the appearance of the 
unwanted effect. Unfortunately, as the system becomes more complicated it becomes more difficult 
to predict all the unwanted interactions. Ultimately the system will develop to the point where, “… 
complicated systems become complex because they are opened up to influences that lie way beyond 
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engineering specifications and reliability predictions” (Dekker, Cilliers, & Hofmeyr, 2011 p.942). The 
behaviour of a complex system cannot be broken into its constituent parts because the complex 
system has properties that emerge from interactions and relationships between the system 
components. Such systems are non-linear and adapt themselves based on their history. Such systems, 
by definition, cannot be fully described by reductive analysis. In reality, “ … barriers, as well as 
professional specialization, policies, procedures, protocols, redundant mechanisms and structures, all 
add to a system’s complexity” (Dekker et al., 2011 p. 942) . 
 
Complexity and control in nuclear power 
 
Even though the word complex has long been associated with nuclear power the consequences of 
working in a complex system have not yet been fully recognised. The philosophy of control does not 
appear to have evolved to take account of the growing complexity of the nuclear power 
organisations. Referring to a case study of the Forsmark incident, 
 
[this] case suggests that organizational learning from nuclear power incidents do not match the 
complexity of the risks the industry faces and more than likely reproduces latent errors… 
Experts are aware of these problems but they lack the conceptual and regulatory means to 
address them. The contemporary regulatory regime relies on mechanistic models for 
understanding organizational processes where instructions and procedures predominate as 
tools for understanding and controlling processes, complemented with an attitudinal or 
moralistic understanding of safety culture and trust in the robustness of the physical plant to 
withstand errors. (Sanne, 2012,  pp. 248-249).  
 
Perin uses the term ‘calculated-logics’ to describe the existing philosophy of control in nuclear power 
(2005). The notion of calculated-logics represents the engineering approach to manage risk, the 
assumptions that are embedded in the plant design basis, and the rules and procedures that have 
been developed to manage the risks and operate according to the design assumptions. This same 
notion is carried through into the typical industry response to incidents where, for example, an issue 
will be prevented from re-occurring provided that revised procedures are followed rigorously (Perin, 
2005).  
 
This philosophy of control is based on traditional Newtonian science. The assumption made is that 
the system as a whole can be understood and controlled by analysis of the system parts. Then the 
system will be safe as long as the parts function as intended, and that they are operated with the pre-
defined procedures that contain operation within the design assumptions. If the system fails then 
something must have broken, and the broken part must be identified and corrected. In the socio-
technical systems that comprises the utility organisation and its safety critical work, the human 
interactions are considered in the same way. Human behaviour is treated mechanistically, and 
frequently a human action that results in an unwanted effect is labelled as human error (Dekker et al., 
2011).  
 
This traditional reductionist modelling of systems is incomplete in that it does not fully describe the 
tasks, or the decision-making processes, involved in managing a complex system on a daily basis. The 
structured task analysis used for training, and for the development of procedures, cannot take into 
account the full range of possibilities of local circumstances, interactions with other activities, and the 
environmental context. Ongoing decision-making does not consist of a string of discrete decision 
events backed up by a full analysis of alternatives. Rather, “operational decisions … [are based] only 
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on the information which, in running context, is necessary to distinguish among the perceived 
alternatives for action”(Rasmussen, 1997 p. 188). Rasmussen continues: 
 
Human behaviour in any work system is shaped by objectives and constraints which must be 
respected by the actors for work performance to be successful. Aiming at such productive 
targets, however, many degrees of freedom are left open which will have to be closed by the 
individual actor by an adaptive search guided by process criteria such as work load, cost 
effectiveness, risk of failure, joy of exploration, etc. The work space within which the human 
actors can navigate freely during this search is bounded by administrative, functional, and 
safety related constraints. The normal changes found in local work conditions lead to frequent 
modifications of strategies and activity will show great variability. (1997, p. 189) 
 
The front line reality! 
 
There is limited empirical research addressing the routine decision making by operations managers, 
particularly where such activity is regarded as successful. Research on decision making in safety 
critical industry has tended to focus on the management of crisis under significant time pressure, or 
the retrospective analysis of significant events. However, the studies by Perin (2005) and Hayes 
(2012) do look at the day-to-day trade-offs made by operations managers under more routine 
conditions. Their empirical research in nuclear power plants confirms the existence of gaps and 
variations that require ongoing assessment and adjustment, as suggested more generally by 
Rasmussen (1997). Obvious risks, particularly high-risk situations, can be managed by pre-
determined procedures. The problem is not so easy when the work of operations managers is about 
managing the low and medium risk of variations in plant performance. This is further complicated by 
the need to manage other variations in the socio-technical system such as staffing, scheduling 
conflicts, or the availability of replacement spare parts. The impact of any malfunction, incident, slip-
up or ambiguity must be considered in relation to the ongoing safe operation of the nuclear plant. 
(Hayes, 2012; Perin, 2005).  
 
The coping mechanism displayed by operations managers, as they oversee the operation of the plant 
on a daily basis, can be labelled as ‘real-time logics’: 
 
[R]eal-time logics reduce and handle risks that design calculations have not anticipated. The 
real-time logics of station experts accompany them as they try to hew to procedures and rules. 
They draw on judgement and inference when interpreting conditions in the moment. (Perin, 
2005, p. 198) 
 
In contrast to the highly structured and documented form of the calculated logics, real-time logics 
respond to the day-to-day issues through “observation, discussion, experience, judgement, insight, 
and interpretation” (Perin, 2005, p. 203). Where the calculated logics are weak or provide no 
direction, real-time logics fill the gaps of calculated logics to maintain control. As such, operations 
managers provide an important contribution to the safety of the system by, 
 
… shoulder[ing] risks no one has foreseen … between designers intentions and how they are 
being realized. Even with wide safety margins and detailed operating procedures, missteps, 
missing resources, miscommunications or mistakes have to be found a put right before they 
can turn into a tragic flaw. … Most of the time those responsible for handing risks … defuse 
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worrisome situations, prevent surprises and keep any that appear from becoming more serious. 
(Perin, 2005, p. ix) 
 
Hayes (2012) study showed that, when faced with a ‘new’ emerging issue, operations managers work 
to maintain the barriers that have been established previously by engineering design or through 
formal organisation rules and procedures. If a barrier is judged to be weak or compromised the 
operations manager will establish a self-imposed temporary limit, or a ‘line-in-the-sand’, to 
compensate.  
 
This [line-in-the-sand] is similar to a limit imposed by a formal operating instruction, but it is 
specific to the particular situation at hand and is developed at the time by the crew based on 
the available information about the state of the system. Within this self-imposed limit, 
personnel continue to monitor the situation and attempt to solve the problem. If the situation 
is not resolved before the limit is reached, then the plant is shut down. (Hayes, 2012, p. 426) 
 
Operations managers have no choice but to work with their system as a whole since they are 
responsible for operation of the system and for meeting the safety and production goals of the 
organisation. The operations managers, as individual agents, do appear to be providing adaptability 
as they work to cope with the various pressures, as they work to understand the status of their 
processes, and act to maintain safety and productivity. This individual adaptability does contribute to 
the success of the organisation on an ongoing basis. However in practice real-time logics “are likely 
to be documented and analyzed more in terms of their failures than their successes” (Perin, 2005 p. 
223). Retroactive reviews of actions taken by managers prior to an event frequently reveal an issue 
with the real-time logics being applied. This frequently results in the application of the ‘human error’ 
label to the manager’s actions, even though the full consequences of the actions can only been seen 
with the benefit of hindsight. 
 
An ‘operational decision making’ process in nuclear power 
 
The nuclear industry has developed an ‘operational decision making’ (ODM) process to give 
guidance to operations managers in handling emerging issues for which there is no procedure. In 
dealing with the complexity of nuclear operations the industry recognised the need to address this 
gap based on its own analysis of industry events. Nuclear utilities have incorporated this guidance in 
their own procedures (Bruce Power, 2011). Given that the ODM process is used for issues that are 
not perceived as an immediate threat to safe operation, time is available for operations managers to 
assemble a team with the expertise necessary to address the problem. Team members are expected to 
bring their specialised knowledge and experience to the table. The team is responsible for making 
recommendations as to the best course of action by considering the specifics of the emerging 
condition in aggregate with the known plant status and the expected operating environment. 
Recognising that the ODM process is activated to deal with conditions that have not been foreseen, 
the staff are frequently challenged by the novelty of the situation. This then requires ODM team 
members to exercise judgement based on their individual skill and experience, as to what forms an 
acceptable path forward, and what is considered safe. 
 
The current ODM guidance in North America does appear to introduce some of the characteristics 
considered helpful in the management of complex systems. For example, the formation of a team 
with diverse knowledge, and empowering each team member with the authority to state their 
concerns, can result in a “diversity of narratives (that) can be seen as an enormous source of 
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resilience in complex systems … not as a weakness” (Dekker, 2011 p. 201). Dekker goes on to stress 
the need to gather as much information as possible, and consider as many consequences as possible, 
when making key decisions in a complex system. Even though Dekker states that it is impossible to 
definitively ‘manage’ a complex system, and that any plan will inevitably be incomplete, a diverse 
approach will help improve the chances of success. 
 
RELEVANCE AND AIM OF RESEARCH  
 
The day-to-day decision-making by operations managers is an important part of the construction of 
safety in managing a complex socio-technical system such as a nuclear power plant. Rather than leave 
operations managers without procedural guidance for unforeseen situations, the nuclear industry has 
implemented the ODM process. This process is intended to assist operations managers in their 
assessment and addressing of emerging issues during their daily work. 
 
The very recognition that situations may emerge that are not addressed by procedural instructions is 
an important first step beyond the overarching control based philosophy. The industry ODM 
process does appear to support the management of a range of issues that have not been identified 
and addressed by pre-determined barriers and controls. In effect the ODM process is attempting to 
provide (procedural) support to the more significant issues being addressed by ‘real-time’ logics. 
However, the prevailing philosophy of control in the nuclear industry, along with its associated 
assumptions, is very strong and it can limit the full appreciation of issues that arise due to system 
complexity.  
 
Perin (2005) identified issues by which the philosophy of control influences the worldview of the 
operations managers within the system. As an example, operations managers still rely heavily on the 
designed barriers, whether they are engineered or procedural. This makes it difficult for the managers 
to recognise where weakness in individual barriers may combine to cause an issue. As an example, in 
2002 significant damage was discovered at the Davis-Besse plant in Ohio. The damage resulted from 
an incipient crack in the reactor vessel head that allowed corrosive coolant to eat away a football-
sized chunk of the reactor pressure vessel. The Davis-Besse organisation had previously 
implemented management control programs to monitor reactor vessel leakage, and to monitor the 
condition of the reactor vessel. Each program focussed on known risks of reactor coolant coming 
into contact with the reactor vessel material, and the danger of damaging the reactor vessel through 
corrosion. In this event, weakness in each of the independent programs combined to allow the 
corrosion to continue over an extended period of time. Such complex interaction amongst the 
barriers is difficult to predict within a control-based regimen. 
  
The philosophy of control also leads to a hierarchy in the relative value the industry places on 
different kinds of knowledge. "The higher value assigned to calculated logics assumes that 
quantitative knowledge is more useful for reducing uncertainty"(Perin, 2005, p. 201). Preference is 
given to quantitative versus qualitative information, or measurable over un-measureable. For 
example, an engineering assessment will be given higher status than the report from a field 
maintainer in the plant. However, when faced with unique emerging situations consideration must be 
given to a much broader range of information. "[As] real-time logics get into gear ... local experts 
draw on memories, observation, experience, judgement ... [and] on best-practices and lessons learned 
from event reports, and on professional experience” (p. 201).  The collection and consideration of 
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diverse data in the ODM process is also critical, and the institutional hierarchy of knowledge may 
also affect this. 
 
There does not appear to be any detailed research that describes the current ODM process. Hayes 
(2012) mentions that ODM procedural guidance had not yet been implemented at the time of 
fieldwork at a UK nuclear plant. As such it would be of value to look at current ODM process in 
some detail in an operational environment, especially given that it has been established for almost ten 
years in North America. Such a study can obtain a deeper understanding of how the current 
approach to ODM is supporting operations managers to overcome the limitations of the calculated 
logics of control. The study can highlight the practices that have been established and identify the 
social framework, relationships and assumptions upon which the process depends.  
 
The objective of the research is to identify to what extent the control philosophy in nuclear power is 
influencing the thinking of its key agents when faced with complex emerging ‘unique’ issues. The 
literature shows that agents may be heavily influenced to maintain the control approach prevalent in 
the industry. As such, the ‘operational decision making’ process may be hampered from recognising 
more diverse ranges of issues and actions, which may help in dealing with complex situations. It is 
hoped that this research can form the foundation for future work on how to supplement the control-
based philosophy in the nuclear power industry. This gives rise to the research question that is the 
basis of this thesis: 
 
“To what extent is the ‘operational decision making’ process of nuclear power operations managers 
part of the nuclear industry’s philosophy of control?” 
 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
In order to study the ODM process it was important to use an approach that can consider the ODM 
process as an integrated social process. The activities initiated once an ODM begins include a great 
deal of discussion in organised meetings. These discussions provide opportunities for the various 
participants to share various forms of information, share ideas and concerns, and form opinions 
based on their own perspectives. Some information is derived from engineering analysis. Other 
information is derived from the experience and knowledge of the various experts involved. The final 
output of the ODM process depends on how the information gathered is processed by the various 
experts involved in the ODM team. 
 
The approach to this research had to consider both the view of each participant and the interactions 
with other participants in order to provide a complete picture of the ODM process. In addition, the 
research sought out the underlying beliefs and assumptions each participant draws upon to develop 
their thoughts and opinions. An ethnographic approach was therefore used to, “produce … in-depth 
understanding of real-world social processes. Properly done, it provides detailed insight into the 
concepts and premises the underlie what people do – but that they are often unaware of” (Forsythe, 
1999, p. 129).   
 
Given that the ODM process is designed to deal with unforeseen situations it would have been very 
difficult to design a simulation study. The research was therefore focussed on the actual working 
environment by using actual ODM experience as a basis for exploration of the ODM process. The 
 
 
14 
ODM process is used approximately 20-30 times a year at a typical plant, and as such provided a 
good source of real-life situations to study. 
 
The ethnographic approach was used to develop a ‘thick description’ of the ODM process. In this 
context ‘thick description’ refers to the collection of detailed information about behaviour of the 
participants, the thinking of the participants, and the context in which the ODM process unfolds to 
address a plant issue. To support the ethnographic methodology data was collected using interviews 
and review of documentation. The following sources were used: 
 
• The ODM process and expectations as described in the utility governance system. 
• Interviews with some of the key participants in the ODM process. 
• A review of the information recorded about the actual ODM event. 
 
Interviews were used to develop a detailed picture of how participants work their way through an 
ODM event. A semi-structured interview process was used to collect data from a cross section of 
key participants in the ODM process (see Appendix A for the interview protocol).  The interview 
was based on actual events chosen by the participants. Even though this study was not intended to 
use a case study approach to actual event situations, it was useful to use the events as a focal point 
for the informants to talk about the ODM process at large. In order to make the interviews as 
effective as possible the interview format was based on a methodology suggested by Crandall et al in 
their text on Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA)(Crandall, Klein, & Hoffman, 2006). CTA is well suited 
to study “work settings in which the knowledge and reasoning of individuals play a role, but so do 
the cognition and reasoning of larger groups of people including, teams and even entire 
organisations” (Crandall, Klein, & Hoffman, 2006 p. 2). As such, the interview technique developed 
by Crandall et al (2006 p. 73-83) was used as a basis for the interview format. A key feature of this 
format is that multiple passes are made through an ‘event’ to build a deeper picture of the ‘story’ 
behind the event. Once the incident has been described and a time-line developed, then probe 
questions are used to “elicit the cues and information available in the situation [and] the meaning 
they held for the participant” (p. 79). In summary, the interview firstly elicited a general description 
of the event, secondly discussed how the participant approached the event, and thirdly, discussed the 
social interactions during the ODM meetings, using the event timeline as a basis for each sweep 
through the event. The interview plan and examples of probe questions is included in Appendix A. 
 
Documentation was reviewed to provide more detail in two aspects. Firstly, the antecedent 
expectations and guidance given to the participants was reviewed. This focused primarily on a 
procedure issued to give specific guidance to managers on the ODM process (Bruce Power, 2011). 
Secondly, the plant record system was reviewed for information that has been written about 
individual ODM events. This data helped to support the creation of the thick description, as 
mentioned above, but also provided information about the ‘trail’ that is left to record the ODM 
event. 
 
To answer the research question, the data collected was reviewed, within the context of the 
ethnographically derived description, for common features and constructs revealed by participants in 
the ODM process. The actual experience of the participants gave important information about the 
social framework, relationships and assumptions upon which the process depends, as well as 
information about how the process is affected by the guiding paradigm of control. 
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Data Collection 
 
Prior to initiating data collection and contacting interviewees I met with senior utility staff to explain 
the purpose of the study, the arrangements for confidentiality and control of information, and the 
interview format. Data that comprised written material was made available through a designated 
utility contact person.  
 
The written procedure for ODM was analysed prior to starting interviews. The actual lived 
experience of the ODM process was obtained through semi-structured interviews of individuals who 
have had significant involvement in the process. The population of key managers involved in the 
ODM process include, Operations managers (OM), Shift managers (SM), Engineering managers 
(EM), and Nuclear-safety advisors (NS). A total of 13 interviews were completed, two OMs, three 
EMs, four SMs, and 4 NS advisors. The nuclear experience level ranged from 4 years to 31 years 
with an average of 19 years. A total of 16 different scenarios were discussed where the ODM process 
had been used to determine the path forward. These scenarios progressed over time frames ranging 
from a few hours, up to several weeks. All the scenarios met the entry criteria for the ODM process 
except for one example of a steam leak which got worse as the ODM process was being initiated, 
resulting in the plant being shutdown immediately for repairs. 
 
Analysis 
 
The interviews and document review provided material to develop a ‘thick description’ of how 
nuclear operations managers use the ODM process to address issues for which there is no pre-
determined procedure. Each interview captured an interviewee’s thoughts and actions as they 
interacted with the ODM process, and with other participants in the process. Interview data was 
compared with the governing documentation to understand the influence of governance on the 
ODM process, but also to identify any differences between the process as imagined, and the process 
as practiced. 
 
The discourse revealed by the analysis of interviews and documents was examined closely for 
meaning to reveal the guiding paradigm. For example, the use of the word diversity, or the 
implementation of a diverse process, can be seen in at least two different ways. Within the 
philosophy of control the term diversity is defined as a design objective where systems and barriers 
are built from different concepts, from different designs, with equipment from different 
manufacturers. Hence diversity is an engineering control defence against common-mode failure. In 
contrast, diversity in a paradigm of complexity “can be seen as an enormous source of resilience in 
complex systems, not as a weakness. The more angles, the more there can be to learn” (Dekker, 
Cilliers, & Hofmeyr, 2011 p. 944). When approaching the interview data from these two possible 
paradigms, what does diversity mean to the participants and how does that impact the ability of the 
ODM process to identify issues that relate to interactions and relationships rather than the 
maintenance of or creation of new barriers. 
 
Ethical Considerations 
 
I obtained agreement with a major nuclear power utility to perform the research at their facility in 
Canada. This company agreed to provide access to staff and documents relevant to the research 
project. This agreement was at no cost, no remuneration, or any other sponsorship support other 
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than the time of the selected informants. An agreement was in place between the researcher and the 
company to cover this arrangement.  
 
Given the highly sensitive public reputation of the industry, and the need for the industry to interface 
with a large number of regulators, it is important that any published research be sensitive to 
corporate reputation. Ongoing communication throughout the research project between the 
designated company contact and myself ensured that any issues that may affect corporate reputation 
were identified. The research agreement had the proviso that the company review the research thesis 
prior to evaluation or publication. The company has acknowledged that the thesis will be published 
upon acceptance by the university. 
 
This study was about people doing their work and what are the social and historical influences. It did 
not include the gathering of sensitive personal information. It is also not about making judgements 
about what is right or is wrong. It is also not about comparing the relative performance of 
individuals, nor about auditing performance against industry or regulatory standards. 
 
In order that each informant be comfortable with involvement in the study an informed consent 
form was reviewed with the interviewees that covered the purpose of the study, the name and 
background of the researcher, and the names and contact information of the supervisor and assessor. 
The form included a summary of how notes and recordings will be kept secure and that this data will 
be destroyed after a time interval that allows for academic verification of the research. The data will 
not be made available for any other purpose. Individuals will not be quoted by name, however due to 
the small sample size of some of the roles it will be difficult to guarantee anonymity. In these cases 
the researcher will contact the informant for specific permission to use the quotation. A copy of the 
final research paper will be made available to each informant. Each participant signed the consent 
form to acknowledge their voluntary participation and their approval to record the interview prior to 
collection of data. A copy of this form was filed with the research files. 
 
I complied with generic ethical guidelines for performing this type of research (Hermerén, 2011). In 
addition, to complete a valid and reliable study it was important to acknowledge my own experience 
as an ‘insider’ with thirty years of previous nuclear experience. This experience was of considerable 
advantage in that the technical language, the form of the issues, and the structure of the organisation 
were very familiar. However, this could also lead to easy acceptance of observations as fact, the 
inability to see tacit knowledge and assumptions, and to be caught in the belief system. Forsythe 
(1999) speaks directly to this issue and offers the comfort that “ ethnography usually works best 
when conducted by an outsider with considerable inside experience” (p. 130). Good ethnography in 
turn then requires maintaining mental distance and systematic methodology. This in turn required me 
to be clear about my methodology and ensure that all my work was linked to the evidence obtained 
from the interviewees. 
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Organisational context  
 
The utility site has two plants of similar design with each plant containing four reactors and the 
associated turbines and generators. Each plant has a standardised organisation that provides all the 
primary support to the operating facility. The plant organisations contain the functions required to 
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operate and maintain the plant, which include operations, maintenance, station engineering, 
chemistry, safety, performance improvement, and scheduling. The utility organisation also includes a 
central corporate organisation that provides support to the two plants. The central functions include 
design and specialist engineering, regulatory affairs, emergency management, security, training, 
human resources, finance, IT, supply chain and corporate affairs. Corporate program managers 
support and maintain the programs, processes and procedures that govern activity within the 
corporation. 
 
The organisational hierarchy and the authorities for approving action are clearly defined in the 
organisation. The programs that govern the activity of each major program are also identical at each 
plant. For example the overall program to manage operations is the same at both plants, and within 
the operations program the procedure for operational decision-making applies to both plants. The 
plant Operations Manager (OM) is the ‘Senior Operating Authority’ and is accountable for the safe 
operation of that plant. Any procedure issued to plant operators to manipulate the plant has to be 
approved by the OM.  This includes any short-term instructions that may result from emerging plant 
issues.  
 
Plant operational activities are managed on a 24-hour basis under the leadership of the duty Shift 
Manager (SM). The SM leads a crew of operators based in the control room. Each of the four 
reactor/generator units is under the oversight of an Authorised Nuclear Operator (ANO) who is 
responsible for manipulation of the controls. The Unit ANOs and the operators in charge of 
common support systems and the fuelling systems, all report to a Control Room Shift Supervisor 
(CRSS). The SM, CRSS, and ANOs are all licenced by the regulator for their role in plant operations. 
The SM always has access to the OM or delegate ‘duty manager’ via pager and/or phone. The OM 
maintains a ‘duty manager’ list to ensure the SM always has access to himself, or a senior manager 
with the delegated authority of the OM. 
 
The plant operators continually monitor the plant very closely. They have ongoing discussions with 
the CRSS and SM of any issues that generate concern. The urgency of any issue depends on where 
the issue fits within the understood system limits as defined in operating documentation. It also 
depends on the rate of progress of the issue towards any limit and the amount of margin remaining. 
In conditions of rapid deterioration the duty crew enters a pre-defined ‘response to upsets’ where all 
duty operators are summoned to the control room and adopt a pre-defined response. The duty SM 
will follow a conservative decision making process to stabilize the plant in a known safe state using 
normal procedures, abnormal incident procedures, or emergency procedures. In the event that an 
issue has immediate operational significance or has more substantial implications, then the duty SM 
can contact the OM directly via phone or pager to discuss immediately. A duty manager is always 
available who has the authority of the operations division manager. The primary sources of issues 
that enter the ODM process arise from this kind of direct monitoring of the plant. 
 
A nuclear power organisation also has ‘system engineering’ staff that are tasked with monitoring the 
overall performance of their assigned systems. Where operators are monitoring the overall plant on a 
minute-by-minute basis, the system engineers are collecting in-depth data about the longer-term 
performance and condition of each plant system. If engineering staff recognise a significant issue 
from their own analysis, observations, or industry experience, they follow an engineering evaluation 
process by which, ultimately, they inform the duty SM and the Operations Manager. The engineering 
evaluation process has criteria for the level of verification, multi-discipline review, and level of 
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authority that is required to respond to any identified plant issue (Bruce Power, 2013b). This is the 
other source of issues that enter the ODM process. 
 
Safety is addressed in both physical plant design, and in the organisational processes that govern 
operation of the plant. The term ‘reactor safety’ is used to capture all of the systems and processes 
that manage the unique hazards posed by a nuclear power reactor. Ultimately the aim of reactor 
safety is to manage the overall risk to the public from the operation of the facility. The key principles 
of reactor safety can be summarised simply by the industry maxim ‘control, cool, contain’. Reactor 
safety is assured by ‘controlling’ the power generated by the reactor core, ‘cooling’ the reactor core to 
maintain its temperature within design limits, and, ‘contain’ the radioactivity that resides in the 
reactor core. The plant is designed with structural features to implement control, cool and contain as 
part of the normal operation of the reactor / generator unit. Additional designed safety features are 
included to address a set of design basis events such as Loss of Coolant Accident or a Loss of 
Regulation. These safety systems comprise the automatic shutdown systems, emergency coolant 
injection systems, and the containment system. The design assumptions and analysis form part of the 
‘safe operating envelope’ (SOE) of the plant. 
 
In addition to the physical plant, the implementation of control, cool, contain must also be carried 
into the governance and procedures by which the plant is staffed, operated and maintained. These 
non-structural elements guide the power plant staff in how to manage their work, and also provide 
specific instructions on how to operate the plant safely. It would be overwhelming to have to 
consider every design constraint each time an operator had to manipulate the plant, so the required 
operating limits are embedded in the operating procedures. Operator training is then based on these 
procedures as well as being used in the plant. The collection of procedures known as the ‘operating 
manual’ is an important vehicle to ensure all the requirements are met, and as such it is expected that 
the operating manual is used with strict adherence at all times. 
 
Operators are expected to use approved procedures when performing operations that directly 
manipulate plant equipment. The only exception to this requirement is when taking action in 
response to emergency condition[s] … If a procedure is not available then do not proceed with 
the operation until a procedure has been approved. (Bruce Power, 2013b. p. 39) 
 
This context section shows that this nuclear power utility is operated in a very highly structured way 
with great emphasis on organisation structure, programs, processes and procedures. This also shows 
that the utility is operated using the guiding philosophy of control that is prevalent in the nuclear 
industry. As such, the use of a large set of explicit pre-defined procedures is a very important part of 
the safety philosophy. But how do the organisation and its front line managers respond when a 
situation develops for which a procedure has not been provided?  
 
Operational Decision Making as documented 
 
The ODM process 
 
The ODM procedure is part of the suite of procedures that are used to define requirements and 
guide the operations staff in the safe operation of the plant. The ODM procedure, along with its 
associated ‘Operational Decision Making Checklist’ (Bruce Power, n.d.), is designed to address the 
issue of situations that arise where the path forward is not addressed by existing procedure. 
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This procedure provides a structured approach for making operational decisions to support 
safe, reliable plant operation. The focus of this procedure is on the response to 
degraded/degrading equipment or plant conditions that are inside OP&P1 limits and are not 
clearly defined by procedures. These are situations typically involving reductions in safety 
margins that evolve over days or weeks. (Bruce Power, 2011, p. 2) 
 
The procedure also defines carefully when it should not be used. For example, “[i]f time does not 
allow for advance consultation with resource groups and the duty manager, the operating crew shall 
place the plant in a safe state and then seek guidance on the follow-up actions required” (Bruce 
Power, 2011 p. 3). 
 
The stated objective of ODM is to support the making of decisions such that “decisions are based 
on a full understanding of short and long term risks and the aggregate impact of conditions 
associated with various options” (p. 4). The procedure defines ODM as, “the processes and 
attributes employed by personnel in response to abnormal or degrading equipment or plant 
conditions” (Bruce Power, 2011 p. 2). The format of the procedure includes both the instructions to 
enact the process, with the attributes intermingled with the descriptions of each process step. The 
ODM process is initiated when approved by the OM after a discussion with the duty SM. A team 
with a predefined minimum membership enacts the ODM process. The output of the ODM process 
is presented to the OM for final acceptance or rejection. Lastly, the procedure also emphasises that 
“a structured approach must be followed” (p. 4). This emphasises the general expectation that you 
must be ‘in process’, or in other words, following the procedure, when faced with the defined entry 
conditions.  
 
The core of the ODM process has four parts that include: describe the operational issue, evaluate 
potential decisions, recommend decision, and implementation plan. In essence, the ODM team 
works through the four parts and uses the checklist to help consider if each part has been 
satisfactorily completed. 
 
The first part is to describe the operational issue. The purpose of this step is to clearly define the 
problem, its scope, and ensure that any supporting information is validated. This step is also used to 
identify the consequences of the issue, particularly the ‘worst case scenario’. The checklist has a 
section to support this step of ‘defining the problem’, and it lists a series of memory jog style 
questions such as consideration of safety consequences, consideration of aggregate impact with other 
plant issues, and whether formal troubleshooting processes have been considered. It also asks several 
questions around validation of data, “Have all the facts and conclusions been documented and 
verified. Is there enough data to support the conclusions? Are all of the indications received fully 
explained?”(Bruce Power, n.d., p. 3)  
 
The second part of the ODM process is ‘evaluation of potential decisions’. Again the procedure 
refers the team to the corresponding checklist section where questions ask, “have all potential 
                                                
 
1 The Operating Policies and Principles (OP&Ps) are laid out in a high level document which is agreed with the 
Regulator. The document contains three types of guidance. (1) Authorities to provide control room supervision, to 
operate the controls and to approve plant procedures (2) Principles to perform maintenance and testing work e.g. a 
system shall be placed in a safe state prior to maintenance, and the system shall be tested prior to being made 
available for service (3) A list of key technical parameters, e.g. maximum reactor power, maximum system pressure. 
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alternatives been considered?” and, “has each potential solution been rigorously evaluated?” (Bruce 
Power, n.d., p. 3). The checklist includes prompts to consider, in addition to risks and consequences, 
whether there are issues with license compliance, safety margins, and consideration of un-intended 
consequences. The checklist also includes prompts to consider other risk or problem evaluation 
tools.  
 
The third part of the ODM process is the ‘recommended decision’. To come to a decision the 
checklist advises the group to “ensure that the team avoids group think and all options are equally 
evaluated” (Bruce Power, n.d., p. 3). The checklist also asks, “Do all personnel on the ODM team 
support the decision? Do personnel who will execute the plan support it?” (idem).  
 
The final part of the ODM process is to develop a plan to implement the decision. The checklist 
prompts that the plan needs to address adequate documentation, clear roles and responsibilities, 
contingency plans and resources. When the ODM team is happy that they have followed the process 
and have developed a path forward, the completed ODM form is taken to the Operations Manager 
for his or her acceptance or rejection. 
 
The ODM procedure establishes that, even in an ambiguous or uncertain situation, then being ‘in the 
process’ is the expected place to be. Thus, even though there is no pre-determined procedure for the 
specific issue, a pre-determined approach is expected to be used to manage the issue. This 
expectation is encouraged by senior leaders as described by a SM, “the Plant Manager and the Vice 
President regularly, in an open forum, say ‘what process are you going to be in?’ SM3. The advantage of this was 
explained by another SM,  “We all know where we stand if we are inside a managed process” SM4. This also 
contributes to a level of ‘comfort’ that was mentioned by several interviewees.   
 
“I know we have the rigor, we have the process, the framework that gets us into process when we don’t have a 
process. It gets us into someplace [that is] a comfort in some ways. It brings down the level of anxiety because an 
ODM is [required] because we are in an emergent situation and we need to make a decision” EN2. 
 
The four parts of the ODM process, as outlined in the procedure mirror very closely the typical, 
ubiquitous, decision making steps in any conventional managerial textbook, i.e. define the problem, 
identify possible solutions, evaluate possible solutions and finally choose an option (Hayes, 2013). 
This suggests that the premise for success in ODM is based on a process of rational choice. This 
leads to the need to identify credible options and make a correct assessment of each option. The 
procedure sets some high level standards for acceptable recommendations, for example, “decisions 
are based on a full understanding of short and long term risk” (p. 4). Even though this type of 
guidance is very subjective and the effective application of the process still depends heavily on the 
experience and judgement of the participants, the rational approach suggests that the ODM process 
is mostly aligned with the existing philosophy of control. 
 
The ODM team 
 
A multi-disciplinary ODM team will be formed to address the ODM issue. The ODM team must 
include, as a minimum, a representative from Operations, a representative from Engineering, and a 
‘Nuclear Safety Culture Advocate’. The advocate role is also commonly referred to as the ‘black-hat’. 
The team leader is assigned by the OM and is always a qualified SM, who will also act as the 
operations representative. Additional team members will be assigned depending on the team leaders 
judgement of the skills and experience required to address the issue.  
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The ‘Nuclear Safety Culture advocate’ has a specific role assigned to help the team avoid 
‘groupthink’. “This person shall remain independent from the decision process, and will challenge 
the recommendations and rationale …” (Bruce Power, 2011, p. 8). This person is typically referred to 
as the ‘black-hat’. This role can be filled by another SM, or can be filled by a Nuclear Safety Advisor. 
In addition to help avoiding groupthink, the black hat is expected to challenge anything that does not 
comply with, 
 
-Operate conservatively 
-Do not relax rules in times of crisis 
-Maintain defense in depth 
-Verify actions affecting reactor safety 
-If in doubt, stop and ask 
-Ensure all actions stand up to critical scrutiny 
-Understand the implications of any change 
-Do not live with problems 
-Determine and correct underlying reasons for problems 
-Keep it simple (Bruce Power, 2011 p. 8) 
 
Lastly, ODM teams usually include a ‘Nuclear Safety Advisor’. The nuclear safety advisor role is a 
function within engineering that specialises in the SOE. The SOE forms a large body of knowledge 
and is difficult for any one person to be familiar with the whole. For day-to-day operations the 
required operational limits, along with any required margins, are embedded in the plant operational 
procedures that are used by the operations staff to operate the plant. However, in cases where there 
is no procedure it is important to establish what SOE limits apply and where, if any, margin exists. 
The NS advisor provides a first level of support, and will request specialist support as required to 
help. 
 
The mandated formation of a team to address an ODM issue suggests that there is value expected 
from social interaction to augment the rational approach to decision making. The procedure refers to 
a multi-discipline team being formed, and as a minimum mandates three types of expertise to be 
involved. The ODM team leader is a qualified SM who has broad expertise in the overall operation 
of the plant. A NS advisor who brings expertise in the overall safe operating envelope of the plant 
typically fills the ‘black hat’ role. The team is then supplemented with engineering expertise that is of 
much greater depth but more focussed in specialist areas. 
 
The membership of the team is also further defined by the specific expertise added to the team based 
on the team leaders preliminary analysis of the ODM issue. The team leader will add additional 
expertise based on the need to address the technical issues that are anticipated. It is also true that 
expertise can be added if, during the ODM team deliberations they find they need additional 
expertise. However, a team built based on what is ‘needed’ to solve a specific problem cannot be said 
to be a truly diverse team. This lack of diversity is balanced, to some extent, by the mandatory 
inclusion of an Operations representative, and a representative from Nuclear Safety, both of who 
have expertise that is broad across the plant, as opposed to the narrow but deep expertise of 
engineering. But this expertise is primarily technical in nature. As such the team formation is 
influenced heavily by an analytic approach. A diverse team may have a different mix. For example, 
one manager speculated that ODMs could perhaps be improved by the inclusion of a facilitator, or 
by the inclusion of a HR performance or leadership trainer. Also, a diverse team membership would 
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be defined by the nature of the ‘system’ rather than by the nature of the specific ‘issue’ being 
addressed. 
 
The procedure identifies groupthink as a potential issue with group problem solving. However the 
procedure gives no specific guidance on how to avoid groupthink. The written guidance for the 
black hat can be characterised as assuring compliance to standards and verifying recommendations 
meet existing requirements. It appears that the procedure sets up the ‘black hat’ as an oversight 
function. The term ‘oversight’ is used in nuclear power to describe the observation of activity to 
establish if the work is being completed to the required standard. This also suggests adherence to the 
prevalent reductionist approach to problem solving. It does not appear that the ‘black hat’ is 
instructed to stimulate new arguments by behaving in a ‘devils advocate’2 fashion when he or she is 
being asked to remain independent of the discussion, as opposed to being asked to be intrusive in 
the discussion. 
 
The attributes of ODM participants 
 
The definition of ODM also includes “… attributes employed by personnel …” (Bruce Power, 2011, 
p. 2). These attributes are included to define how ODM participants, and in some cases, all facility 
staff, think and behave towards the process. All facility personnel are expected to,  
 
Be vigilant and promptly report potential threats to personal safety or safe, reliable operations 
… [and] exercise a questioning attitude. Do not hesitate to challenge proposed actions if they 
do not appear to adequately address the objective of safe, reliable plant operation (p.12). 
 
Exercising a ‘questioning attitude’ is emphasised in several places in the procedure. The procedure 
encourages all ODM participants to “freely express opinions and counter arguments. They must not 
hesitate to give dissenting views” (p. 8). Finally, when considering adverse outcomes, “always 
consider what the worst case scenario might be … avoid discrediting facts that do not support a 
preferred outcome … [and] beware of technical arrogance i.e. over reliance on past successes, failure 
to consider external opinions” (p.7) 
 
The attributes appear to provide motivational guidance to the participants in the ODM process with 
the implication that the ODM process will be successful provided that the participants are thorough 
and attentive to every detail, and are prepared to challenge anything they believe to be unsafe. 
Inclusion of these elements in the ODM procedure suggests that control of the human behaviours is 
thought necessary for successful outcomes, which in turn suggests a continuation of the philosophy 
of control. Conversely it can also be seen that an objective of the procedure writer is to help create 
an environment where anyone can talk of his or her concerns freely, especially in the face of an 
emerging situation. However, it remains an individual responsibility to raise issues and concerns, 
rather than perhaps, defining ‘free speech’ as an attribute of the social process being expected in the 
ODM meeting. 
 
Operational Decision Making in practice 
 
                                                
 
2 A dictionary definition of devils advocate is “a person who supports an opposing or unpopular view in order to 
promote argument or discussion”(Barber, 2004, p.413). 
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Initiating the ODM process. 
 
The first step is deciding whether an issue should be handled by use of the ODM process. One shift 
manager described the threshold for using the ODM process as, “We are in grey territory, where we are 
outside procedure and there is perceived risk but we don’t fully understand the risk or we don’t have enough information 
to make an informed decision” SM3. The very first step in the ODM process still relies on the judgement 
of experienced staff. An operations manager stated,  
 
“there are three criteria [to initiate an ODM] but it is still subject to experience and judgement. [Persons 
involved in this type of decision] must have an understanding of the bigger operating picture… We do rely on the 
team, not just one person. No one is ever alone when facing uncertainty here. ODMs are started based on front 
line monitoring. Field and engineering staff make suggestions”OM1.  
 
Conversely, not initiating the ODM process when it should be utilised can result in making some 
situations worse. A few years ago, “the duty crew attempted to troubleshoot [a leaking valve] on their own. In the 
process they created a bigger leak that they were not prepared to deal with. They had not thought through the possible 
consequences / outcomes” OM1. A SM also mentioned this event,  
 
“[The] decision [was]made in real time, and, as discussed with the crew afterwards, the duty SM, there was no 
pressure to do it that day. We could have stopped and consulted but we didn’t. Nobody had any hint that 
anything would go bad” SM4.  
 
The SM reflected about this incident, which happened to another crew,  
 
“how do you watch your self and the situation; have the situation awareness conceptually to put yourself in a 
space and say, I think I might be wandering into knowledge based mode here, and are there consequences with 
that that I need to address more formally” SM4. 
 
Given that judgement has to be applied, the plant management teams do reflect upon where they set 
the threshold for initiation of ODMs. Initiating unnecessary ODMs by being ‘over-sensitive’ is a 
waste of resources and reduces confidence in the judgement of the leadership. However it is also 
incumbent on front line operations managers to actually recognise that a given situation requires an 
ODM approach to safely manage the path forward. The difficulty of the intervention decision gives 
an indication of the complexity of the operations environment. In response to this uncertainty SMs 
are being actively encouraged by senior plant managers to initiate an ODM anytime doubt arises 
about a new risk or a path forward. As long as the issue is developing slowly enough “the duty crew are 
expected to initiate getting the [ODM] team together” OM1. The Operation Managers are more focussed on 
encouraging the use of the process than any concern about it being overused.  
 
The ODM process is intended to help operations managers address emerging issues by providing 
instructions to enact a process. This implicitly acknowledges that the operations environment is not 
fully characterised by the existing procedural guidance and can be seen as a vehicle to support the 
‘real-time’ logics of plant managers. Even though the ODM procedure is written in a format similar 
to other operating instructions, with entry criteria dictating when the procedure is appropriate, the 
operations managers are still faced with the ongoing challenge of recognising potential ODM events, 
and then making an accurate assessment of the need to follow the ODM process. The organisation 
leadership does acknowledge the uncertainty by continuing to ask about plant conditions, and by 
encouraging the use of the ODM process when any doubt arises. The ODM process is thus 
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established at the nexus of the procedurally controlled system and that part of the system which is 
not yet included in the set of defined procedural instructions.  
 
Time pressure 
 
The use of the ODM process takes time. However plant management are reinforcing that the 
process should be used even if it takes longer to make a decision.  
 
“Any time pressure is set by the plant and not by the organisation. We rarely put time pressure on a person. It 
is usually self-perceived. So if the plant is deteriorating quickly, there is no time to get a team, then the duty crew 
has to handle it. The duty crew will make the call. If the issue is slower, then they are expected to initiate getting 
the [ODM] team together.” OM1.  
 
This was confirmed by a SM interviewee,  
 
“for many years … the operations line [management] ... has been very clear that if you have an issue on the 
table don’t proceed, if its safe to be where you are, until you are sure you have the information you need and you 
have a rationale that is sound for choosing direction A or direction B. It doesn’t relieve the pressure entirely 
when you are in a real time situation with a variety of paths that may be available to you, [but] there is 
actually, other than the self-imposed pressure, nothing to say I have to act quickly. I actually have a mandate, 
and indeed my role as a shift manager or as an informal leader in my role on days, my role is to model those 
behaviours” SM4. 
 
Even in the case of commercial pressure the ODM process is encouraged. An OM mentioned an 
example where the issue of concern had resulted in stopping critical path work during a major 
outage. In spite of adversely affecting the outage schedule “the emphasis was on focus on the safety issues, 
and focus on getting it right before we proceeded. There were no ‘hours lost’ questions to the team while they were 
working on the issue”OM1. 
 
In some situations, due to the rate of progression of the issue, the duty SM will establish their own 
limit based on their judgement of the situation, even though they have initiated the ODM process. 
As an example, when faced by a steam leak that was getting worse the duty SM was unsure that he 
would get engineering advice in time. “The SM says, OK, I’m going to make up the rules. In the absence of 
engineering giving me a rule I’m going to set my own standard and that’s going to be if the rate of condensate collection 
doubles in 3 hours, I am going to take the unit off line” SM3. This value was chosen using best judgement, 
but the SM considerations included what would be required to manage the leak, and the length of 
time it would take to cool down that area of the plant. This is an example of the ‘line-in-the-sand’ 
approach (Hayes, 2012). However interviewees indicated that this type of scenario is relatively rare in 
the current utility operating experience. 
 
The influence of time-pressure is usually discussed in terms of external pressure arising from the 
emerging issue itself, or the need to maintain production in a business environment. Several 
interviewees did mention the tendency for people to try to jump to a solution and fix the problem 
quickly. One SM commented “ the biggest problem was the sense of urgency and trying to slow it down … one 
person wanted to …[immediately] start to manipulate valves” SM1, when describing his crews initial reaction 
to an emerging issue. Another SM referred to “… the natural human tendency to rush to a solution which 
may or may not work” SM4. An engineering manager commented that the initial stages of problem 
solving “seems [like] a barrage of information … and it can lead folks off to jumping to solutions”. Adding a 
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possible explanation “I don’t know if its engineers or whatever it is. We want to come running out the door within 
an hour and say ‘go do that’. You have to hold everybody back and say here’s a pathway to the solution” EN1. The 
perception of time pressure can be seen to arisen from internal motivational factors, as well as the 
external pressures. Interviewees mentioned that the stop and consult expectation of the ODM 
process was just as important to manage this internal pressure as it was to manage external pressures. 
 
This discussion of time pressure helps to emphasise the importance of the main ODM themes which 
are stop, consult, and use a structured process to decide a path forward. It is rare that operations 
staff has to make a quick decision on an emerging issue. At the simplest level the taking of time to 
approach a problem helps to eliminate the risks of well-intentioned quick fixes, which have not had 
full consideration of all possible outcomes. The management of time pressure also gives time to 
enact the consultative, or social, form of decision-making that is required by the ODM process. This 
consumption of time can result in pressure on both individuals and the business. It is clear from the 
interviewees that senior managers encourage a conservative approach when faced with uncertainty, 
and support this use of time in the face of business pressure. The commercial pressure is always 
present, but the impact is justified by the timely and diligent implementation of the organisationally 
approved ODM process. 
 
Organisational evidence from the ODM meeting 
 
Once a decision is made to initiate an ODM the OM will appoint a SM qualified individual to lead 
the ODM team. The SM is a natural choice for leading the ODM team. The SM role is a key position 
with a significant level of authority and SMs receive extensive training during their qualification 
process. The SM has extensive knowledge and experience with overall integrated station operation, 
and then a basic understanding of the fundamentals of each system element. This contrasts with the 
other participants who are more specialised in their expertise.  
 
“The engineering folks can really talk to the very specific piece in a lot of detail but cant always relate what does 
that mean for the overall integrated risk or what is that for integrated operation. The other folks that have 
certification training / experience you can see that, based on the questions they are asking, … what is the risk 
of continued operation?” OM2.  
 
It is possible that the organisational authority of the SM could introduce bias while providing 
leadership. One interviewee explained:  
 
“It is usual that … the operations guy is looked towards … the others are at a disadvantage [because] they 
know specifics about the component or system, but not the bigger picture. The ops guy is probably the one guy 
there who knows the most about operations combined with a bit about the engineering and a bit of reactor safety. 
But each of the other two is more specialist in their particular area” SM2.  
 
In spite of the organisational authority of the SM, the discussion remains free and open and, “while 
there are dominant personalities [referring to a ‘typical’ SM] it is not dominant in the way of imposing their will on 
anyone else” SM2. This is confirmed by a non-SM interviewee:  
 
“[A] good thing is you will have the SM there, many years experience under his belt, you will have ANOs 
there, fairly experienced people, maintenance guys who are very experienced, but scattered in there you may have 
engineers with only a year from university, and maybe have a fuel and physics specialist … I’ve always found in 
ODMs that there is always great respect shown for everyone in the room … there is no authority being used in 
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terms of the SM ruling the roost by the fact that he is the senior guy. Everybody has his or her say, everybody is 
treated as an equal, and everybody’s opinion is respected. I’ve seen that in every ODM I have been to. I have 
never had any concern that someone is keeping quiet because they are scared to speak up” NS4.  
 
This evidence suggests that the participants in the ODM process work in an environment in which 
the authority gradient is minimised. The ODM team leader may have ideas about potential 
recommendations when entering the meeting but the evidence shows he or she will not use 
organisational authority to drive a particular outcome in the ODM process. 
 
The first step in the ODM process is to describe the operational issue as accurately and concisely as 
possible. This step also serves the function of bringing everyone on the team to the same place in the 
current understanding of the issue.  
 
“I usually have the engineering folks, because they have prepared the evaluation, and they are best placed to run 
through it. They lay out the description of the issue. Then, after they have done that I’ll discuss the operational 
impacts … after that people will ask questions to get a common understanding, then we will move into potential 
decisions. At that point it is pretty much an open floor for people to propose potential choices”SM2.  
 
The initial discussion of the issue thus relies heavily on the engineering expertise.  Several 
interviewees mentioned that there is a lot of respect for expertise at the ODM table, but as stated by 
one interviewee, “the danger there is that if everyone is in awe of the expert you can accept what they say at face 
value. But the process works if you follow the questioning attitude… it drives you to ask questions to validate …” 
EN2. For deeply technical issues the expert can expect to be questioned and challenged as the others 
in the team come to an understanding of the position of the expert. This is not seen as an attack on 
the capability of the expert, but as part of a culture that seeks to fully understand.  
 
“People that are brought to the table are experienced ... recognised that they are highly competent in their area. 
At the same time we are all human and can make mistakes. It is free and open environment to ask and 
challenge, in a positive way. Following that approach you build confidence in the positions being presented. 
Questions are asked to clarify… and make sure I understand what the expert is saying” EN2.  
 
It is also possible that ODM team members raise issues based on intuition or gut-feel. Interviewees 
mentioned it is an important part the ODM process to not leave a doubt or concern un-addressed. 
An operations manager stated his expectation that, “everybody has a right to speak up and if their gut-feel is 
not right we have to stop to satisfy and understand it more. If one person voices a concern it is possible that others may 
share similar concerns”OM2. An engineering manager also confirmed, “you have a right to question things … 
there is no such thing as a stupid question. Say it. We will listen to it and answer it. It establishes a right for you, 
especially a new person or a more timid person.” EN1. ODM groups do feel obligated to help the individual 
understand why they feel that way, and help them to flush out the root of the concerns. “Its kind of 
like a jury … if one person is not comfortable you have to let that person talk about it and listen to what they are 
telling you and then rationalise is there some way we can deal with their concerns” SM3. Several interviewees were 
aware of cases where, for example, an experienced operator was just not comfortable in using a piece 
of degraded equipment even though it was considered nominally serviceable. In this case the ODM 
team supported this operator and recommended taking the equipment out of service rather than use 
the degraded equipment for a further time period. However two of the interviewees mentioned that 
an issue based on gut-feel may get treated differently depending on who is raising it.   
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“Gut-feel has to be weighed by the experience that informs it. A less experienced person would have less weight 
than a more experienced person” NS3. A SM commented,  “I would say it depends on who is raising it… 
if it is someone that you have a lot of respect for it carries more weight … some peoples concerns I would listen to 
more carefully. Again it is subject matter dependent. There are some people, who have more of a tendency to be 
extremely black and white, or rule based, or who have more of a tendency to cry fire in a crowded theatre. Those 
people you can’t discount their input … the nice thing about a public meeting is you cant actually ignore 
someone … Even if its an off the wall question … ask where they are coming from, then look into it more … 
not a bad thing and not unusual to have it happen” SM4.  
 
It can be seen that different sources of expertise, whether it resides with an acknowledged specialist, 
or whether it arises from intuition of an experienced person, have status within the ODM meeting 
environment. Even though the expertise of a specialist is highly respected, the evidence shows that 
participants in the ODM process also see value in addressing gut-feel concerns that do not have an 
associated ‘technical authority’. In addition, it is acceptable for the ‘word’ of the expert to be 
challenged during the discussion. Overall it appears that the environment of the ODM team meeting 
is such that any expertise hierarchy is reduced. However, there still seems a consensus among the 
interviewees that points to a preference for information which is judged to have a valid (technical) 
basis rather than based on the intuition of a team member.  
 
When considering the overarching philosophy of control within nuclear power the clear definition of 
authority is part of the ‘command and control’ approach. Also the status of expertise is important 
within the notion of ‘calculated logics’ (Perin, 2005). It could therefore be expected that these 
dimensions of a control framework would be continued within the ODM process. However it 
appears the ODM environment has, to some degree, balanced the gradients of authority and 
expertise. This in turn creates a forum that supports a group of diverse expertise to have open 
discussion and create common understanding of an emerging issue that is affecting the ‘system’ in 
some way. Thus it appears, at least at the outset of consideration of a new ODM issue, that the 
participants have some freedom to consider different ideas and possibilities that are outside of the 
currently understood procedural framework. This provides opportunity to address the issue that, “in 
a complex system, there is no objective way to determine whose view is right and whose view is 
wrong, since the agents effectively live in different environments” (Dekker, 2011, p. 200) 
 
Discussion and selection of options 
 
The second step of the ODM process is to generate and study options of possible ways to deal with 
the subject issue. There is always a ‘remove from service’ option and a ‘do-nothing’ option, which 
define the range of possible recommendations. Removing the affected equipment from service can 
usually eliminate the issue but this may result in a complete shutdown of the affected generating unit. 
This action will resolve the issue, but commercial impacts will be felt by the organisation. 
Alternatively the ‘do-nothing’ option may result in a slow degradation that will eventually turn into 
failure at some point. It may be difficult to pre-determine exactly when a failure would occur, or it 
may be that the failure could result in an operational transient where the operators have to react to 
the plant disturbance. Between the two extremes other options are developed which will provide a 
prudent course of action, which minimises risk, and which does not cause significant business 
impact. In many cases options will be presented as part of a formal engineering evaluation that has 
been completed as an input to the ODM meeting.  
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“Implicitly it’s a ‘pro and con’ kind of approach. By listing initiating events and deciding which ones we felt we 
needed to cater to and represent a minimal challenge to the operations staff in the control room. Which one do we 
care about the most?” SM4.  
 
The practical implementation of each option is an important part of the discussion. This focuses on 
the ability to see where an issue is getting worse (early warning), and to be able to take corrective 
action or shutdown to maintain full control and certainly before any damage occurs.  
 
“…there was quite a bit of discussion about potential consequences… what was the worst thing that could go 
wrong … basically we, as a group with all the disciplines, we agreed what the worst case is so that we [can 
determine] we actually have control so that we can mitigate anything that can go wrong” NS2.  
 
Ultimately, if there is no confidence in the ability to monitor and respond, then the ODM team will 
recommend taking the equipment out of service, regardless of the business impact. This will also 
apply where the extent of the degradation is too great for continued operation. For options that 
remain under discussion the ODM team assess the relative merits of each remaining option. 
Quantitative information is rarely available and the discussion follows a pattern similar to the one 
described by an engineering manager:  
 
“We could not get to a number in terms of this is our probability that we are not going to have an issue. But 
more based on current condition of equipment, what we are able to monitor, and how quickly can we take action 
if we see a problem. What limits are we going to set on monitoring of parameters versus the limits we know we 
can handle? It was really an assessment of the ability to manage consequence if things go wrong. That part of the 
risk equation3. The probability we believe is low and we couldn’t get a number on probability, but we 
understand the consequence would be to each piece of equipment. And these are the barriers we put in place to 
prevent that consequence from being realised. So out of that comes an acceptable risk level … I rely on my 
understanding of the health of the equipment, my understanding of the design, and the [current] situation and 
then, from that assessment, and we do have experience of how systems operate, we understand how the systems 
react, you can make an assessment of your starting point of risk. Then you can walk your way through all the 
potential scenarios you can think of that could go wrong and then assess whether we believe we have a credible 
way to mitigate the impact of that assessment. And then it is the cumulative effect of all these potential scenarios.  
To get all the credible scenarios, that’s why you need to bring in various perspectives... different people that come 
from a different perspective. You walk your way through each challenges… is there something we missed? Then 
at the end you do an assessment on whether you believe the risk is acceptable…. if we got it wrong how do we 
assure ourselves that there is an acceptable way to mitigate it?” EN2.  
 
It can be seen that the options considered are generated from knowledge and experience of the 
ODM participants based on their assessment of what can go wrong and the consequence associated 
with each scenario. The multi-discipline nature of the group discussion helps to identify as many 
scenarios as possible. Then, rather than considering the probability of each scenario the focus of the 
discussion is based on whether the group feels that each consequence can be managed such that 
operating limits are not exceeded, and that the consequence can be realistically detected and managed 
by the operating crews. This focus on the practical implementation rather than on more abstract ‘risk 
assessment’ methodologies has been noted in previous research (Hayes, 2012, 2013). Ultimately the 
judgement on whether any preferred option is safe is based on an assessment of the practicality and 
                                                
 
3 The generic risk equation referred to is Risk=Probability x Consequence 
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of the effectiveness of the proposed barriers. “For the purposes of operational decision-making this 
approach allows managers to assume that, provided all safety barriers are in place, then the system is 
safe” (Hayes, 2013, p. 137). 
 
This reliance on barriers appears to be a result of the influence of the notion of ‘calculated logics’ 
(Perin, 2005). However the ODM procedure does encourage looking at each option in terms of the 
integrated plant operation and considering the ‘aggregate effects’ of any option in combination with, 
for example, other deficiencies in the plant (Bruce Power, 2011). This broader view can be 
considered a more ‘system’ based view of each option. This is also used both to help identify the 
most appropriate option, but also as an input to development of monitoring plans and contingency 
plans for use by operating crews during the plant implementation of an approved ODM 
recommendation. It is also implicitly assumed that any implementation plan will need to be carefully 
monitored during execution due to the difficulty of predicting every eventuality. As such it appears 
that the rational approach to identifying consequences, and formulating barriers to each 
consequence, is supplemented with a more ‘system-based’ consideration.  
 
The ODM meeting process may possibly inhibit a free discourse on the subject issue due to the 
meeting being seen as ‘making a choice between recommendations’. The interviewees all stressed 
that the ODM meeting is a decision forum. The recommendations are developed using the 
engineering evaluation process and the resulting evaluation is presented to the ODM forum. This 
effectively takes some of the attention paid to the issue into a different forum, which may not have 
the social advantages of the ODM process. However it is usually the case that the engineers involved 
in the evaluation process do also attend the ODM. In spite of best efforts to prepare for an ODM 
meeting, it sometimes happens that the group dynamics show that they need to collect more 
information or study the proposed options further.  
 
“We have had some [ODMs] where we went in with the [recommended] decision and determined that we didn’t 
think we had enough information after all, and we said we are not going to pursue it further. … If you had 
engineering or operations break into mini-brainstorming and then you hear things that you haven’t heard before. 
Then you have the sense that we are not prepared to hold this thing any more because other ideas are coming out 
and they need to be pursued in another forum. The ODM is not for brainstorming and saying ‘maybe we should 
do this instead? It is not for that. You come to the meeting having already thought about the potential 
alternatives and they have all had some rationalisation. There are discussions about the rationale for certain 
decisions but not bringing in new information” SM3.  
 
In another example “there are questions that are asked, and if there is agreement that we don’t have all the facts 
there is an action taken to go, and we are not going progress, until we have the answer come back with validated facts” 
EN2. This evidence suggests that the ODM process is positioned as a ‘decision making’ forum and 
that new data which emerges is moved elsewhere to be pre-rationalised before being considered 
again in the ODM forum.  
 
It is certainly important that any recommendation from the ODM team will have been rigorously 
reviewed prior to being approved for use in the nuclear plant. However it seems to suggest that 
‘discovery’ activity such as the collection and interpretation of data, and the brainstorming of ideas, is 
displaced elsewhere. This may undermine the synergy of the ODM forum in identifying new issues 
of importance. For example, raw data may have different meanings to different meeting participants. 
The focus on the verification of facts may lose broader interpretation of meaning in the data. For 
example, if erroneous data does exist, then why is it visible to the agents within the system? The 
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erroneous data may be excluded during the fact verification process for this event, but what does 
their existence mean for the broader operation of the system and the interaction with future events? 
One OM did raise the rhetorical question “why do we have separate engineering evaluations and ODMs?” 
OM2. He then went on to say that it was likely due to the sheer size of the engineering support 
organisation and was a way of clarifying the interface responsibilities between the engineering 
organisation and the operations organisation. The focus on control by process adherence may 
therefore limit the potential for the discovery of data and the translation to verified facts may 
become disjointed by the procedural (and organisational) separation of the ODM process, and any 
supporting engineering evaluation or troubleshooting process.  
 
Once the group is ready to make a recommendation the ODM leader will go ‘round-the-room’ and 
ask everyone individually if they have any objections. One SM identified that he knows when the 
group is ready to make a recommendation because the “debate on the topic and the vigour dies down. The 
group is no longer asking questions” SM3. At this point the leader completes the ODM form as the 
official record of the ODM discussion. The form has space for a written description of the issue, a 
written evaluation of potential decisions, the recommended decision and rationale, and the 
implementation plan. The form also contains three, yes/no checklists that the group review together. 
The form also includes the names of all present at the ODM meeting. This form is then taken to the 
Operations Manager for discussion and acceptance.  
 
The recommendation of the ODM team is presented to the Operations Manager for approval. In 
assessing the output of the ODM process one Operations Manager describes how he completes his 
review,  
 
“The ODM team leader sends me the final copy of the checklist to review. I then discuss, usually face to face, 
the ODM process with the leader, how it went, any big issues or sticking points. This is an opportunity to ask 
lots of questions and is a part of the final ODM product. Did they capture the problem correctly? Does it 
answer the right question? Look at what was considered. Usually at least three options, including a ‘do-
nothing’. I look at the pro/con analysis. I look at who was on the team. Was it the right cross section? Were 
they knowledgeable? Review for overall completeness. Look at the actions that would be required if I approve the 
decision. What is the plan? Does it make sense? Will it just mitigate a poor condition, or will it improve the 
condition?” OM1.  
 
The OM is not involved directly in the deliberations of the ODM team and relies on the ODM team 
leader to brief him on details of the discussion. The approval process includes a review of the 
‘technical content’ of the recommendation, and a review that the ‘process’ has been followed in a 
credible way. The OM has the option of rejecting the recommendation if his or her personal review 
reveals any concerns. If the ODM is approved then operations staff, along with any required support 
staff, will enact the defined action plan. 
 
The output from the ODM process requires the authority of the OM to be accepted for 
implementation in the physical plant. In applying that authority the OMs do make use of their own 
extensive knowledge and experience base in plant operations to review what is being recommended. 
However they also review the execution of the ODM process as part of the approval process. It is 
recognised that the quality of the recommendation depends on the process as well as the full 
assessment of the ‘technical’ issue.  
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The ODM forms, and any supporting engineering evaluations are kept in a database. A review of the 
forms associated with the events discussed in the interviews revealed a brief summary about the issue 
and how the preferred option was selected. Usually the options considered were listed with a ‘bullet’ 
format list of pros and cons. The chosen recommendation and the rationale were stated briefly, 
along with a list of actions required to support implementation of the decision. The forms do not 
show any detail of the discussion or, for example, the issues based on gut feel or intuition. As an OM 
explained, “[these sort of issues] show up in the team work but not in the documentation. The team works to address 
the issues raised so that they can be resolved to the satisfaction of the individual, and also the satisfaction of the team… 
I then discuss, usually face-to-face, the ODM process with the team leader, how it went, and if there were any big issues 
or sticking points” OM1.  
 
There is also evidence of a hierarchy in the value of the written record associated with the ODM 
process. To illustrate this point, engineering evaluations are presented in a full written memo format 
with all assumptions and judgement clearly identified. The output of the ODM process is 
summarised on a form with a checklist. Perin also found: 
 
The two logics [calculated logics and real time logics] are documented differently. Explicit 
rationales accompany calculated logics on the nuclear side, based on reliability metrics of the 
structures, systems and components of the reactor unit … The rationale for real-time logics 
appear mainly in conversations …But as things stand, industry experts and station managers 
understand these logics less as a partnership than as a hierarchy (2005, p. 199-200). 
 
It is possible that some issues raised in the ODM meeting will not be recorded if they are resolved to 
the satisfaction of the team prior to making a recommendation. This suggests that ‘concerns’ have 
less value than ‘facts’. As they are then not included in the records, these concerns will not be visible 
to staff in the future and hence may not be raised again under different conditions. There appears to 
be more value placed on a comprehensive record of the engineering work when compared with the 
record of the ODM process.  
 
The discussion of options is at the core of the ODM process. The value of a multi-discipline team is 
apparent as they gather information, review possible options and identify potential consequences 
associated with each option. The process does include a consideration of system-based elements 
such as the aggregate plant status, when considering how an adverse scenario may develop. The 
process also requires that any recommendation will include a monitoring plan to recognise when an 
adverse situation is developing and have a credible contingency plan. These items are all items which 
are included by Dekker in his discussion on coping with the aftermath of events in complex systems 
(Dekker, 2011). In the case of ODM, these items are all being considered proactively. 
 
However the process is also influenced by the expectation that the discussion should focus on pre-
rationalised options, for which the basic facts have already been verified. This emphasis on 
controlling and organising the decision process may make it more difficult to build understanding of 
an emerging issue by moving the process of discovery to another forum. This in turn makes it more 
difficult to assess the meaning of the information being made available about the issue in question. 
 
The ‘Black Hat’ 
 
All interviewees expressed that ‘groupthink’ was a phenomena of concern when involved in ODM 
process and all expressed that the ‘black hat’ was the key role designed to counter groupthink 
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behaviour. One interviewee explained groupthink in terms of “defaulting to what everyone else is doing 
because if they are all doing it, it must be ok” NS3. Another interviewee mentioned,  
 
“… it is human nature to develop a stronger level of comfort with a decision if you have people, who are at 
similar or more levels of knowledge or experience that you have, reaching the same conclusion… People coming 
together who may have the same outcome in mind would be able to incorrectly influence each other. There is a lot 
of comfort in having others make a decision with you… it could be competing with your objectivity” NS1.  
 
However when describing the black-hat function most interviewees identified that the role was to act 
as a cold body reviewer and attempt to identify things that had been missed by the group as a whole.  
 
“The ODM process has the ‘black hat’ role. That is the one thing that is different to any of our other decision-
making processes that we have a person who is not supposed to get involved in the detailed discussion. They sit 
back take it all in and provide oversight on the process and the depth of the process and the interactions of the 
people. Oversight is what it is about” NS4.  
 
“A feature of the ODM process is the black hat … listening to the discussion but not participating per se, 
maintaining an objective distance and listening to the discussion and the conclusions that are being reached. And 
when you go around the room at the end of the meeting you save the black hat for the end. What do you think? 
Do you have any concerns or questions or is there anything we have missed?” SM4. 
 
Only one interviewee referred to the black-hat role with the term ‘devils advocate’. The intent of the 
‘black hat’ role is similar to the ubiquitous term ‘devil’s advocate’.  
 
“[The black-hat] has useful knowledge to evaluate if they get the impression people are going down the wrong 
path for whatever reason, be it technically, or just the way a herd goes down one train of thought. Especially if 
there is a strong leader in the group, who is a good leader but not a good operational decision maker… They 
will play devils advocate. If everyone seems happy that something will never happen they might challenge it and 
take it one level deeper. Or do we really we have the technical expertise here to definitively say that or is that 
your pre-conceived notion? … Are people really looking at the worst thing that can happen and do we really 
understand how likely it is to occur?” NS1.  
 
This description is more in line with a dictionary definition which is “a person who supports an 
opposing or unpopular view in order to promote argument or discussion” (Barber, 2004, p.413). 
 
However, it appears that the ‘black hat’ is usually positioned more as a verifier, that is, someone who 
reviews work for completeness and correctness. In one case an interviewee expressed that it was an 
option to “have somebody sit down and review the information I am going to send them. Essentially do an 
independent verification [of the ODM recommendation]” SM4. The ODM procedure implies the black-hat 
provides oversight by monitoring of standards that need to be maintained during the process. 
Monitoring and reinforcing standards is actually a management and supervisory function. 
Verification and oversight are both practices that are firmly entrenched in the control philosophy. 
 
The role of a black hat can actually add value beyond that discussed so far. A black-hat working in 
the style of the ubiquitous devil’s advocate would be very much more interactive throughout the 
meeting, taking contrary views, asking for deeper explanations, looking for adverse interactions. A 
black hat who is thus engaged could also ensure the social factors are monitored, challenging a quiet 
participant, or demanding an answer to an issue that has not been addressed. When imagining the 
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black hat function in this way it is only a short step to see how this role might trigger new discussion 
and identify new issues to be addressed, particularly by challenging any commonly held assumptions, 
or by exposing unnoticed interactive relationships.  
 
A devil’s advocate would also help to address a concern that one interviewee raised that persons who 
bring a narrow field of expertise to the ODM meeting may have difficulty communicating with 
experts in other fields. “You can have [for example] a chemist who is so focussed, ‘I deal with chemistry’… people 
will draw boundaries that I don’t want to get out of my comfort zone, e.g. chemistry. So that does come into play and 
you have to watch for it. You have to force the discussion to happen” SM1. The ‘delivery’ of expertise was of 
concern to another interviewee when explaining that, even though engineering advice is highly 
valued, the acceptance could be affected by the capability of the engineer as a presenter.  
 
“We have quite a spectrum of communicators.  You could have someone who is highly technically knowledgeable 
but communicates poorly, so the quality of their information may be quite high, but how is that internalised by 
the rest of the group? They may give that less value. Whereas we may have a less knowledgeable but more 
charismatic compelling speaker. They may inappropriately accept that advice with a higher level of contribution 
to the discussion… [To counter this] we will apply the black-hat in the room” EN3.  
 
The role of the black hat has been described in three different ways, the verifier, the oversight 
person, or the ‘devil’s advocate’. The first two are a continuation of the control-based philosophy. In 
contrast, the less familiar devil’s advocate role has potential to help reveal new information. It seems 
there is opportunity for the utility to examine its expectations of this role. Ultimately the question for 
the ODM process is, do we know everything we don’t know versus double-checking everything we 
do know? This again raises the concern that a focus on gathering and verifying facts may result in 
important data being missed. It could be suggested that the black-hat function be focussed on 
discovery, and the roles of verification and oversight be completed by supervisors or by oversight 
personnel. 
 
The value of Operational Decision Making 
 
In practice operations managers are faced with an ongoing stream of daily decisions to manage the 
plant and the associated activity to operate and maintain the facility. Even though the ODM process 
is not used for every decision, it is clear that the plant managers have to deal with an ongoing range 
of issues that are not clearly addressed by the procedures. Hence the evidence shows that the real-
time logics discussed by Perin (2005) are still an important part of the daily life of operations 
managers in 2013. 
 
When talking about the overall ODM process some interviewees mentioned the challenge of making 
judgements on issues that do not have clear black and white answers. “There is no real proof afterwards 
that your decision was the best one ... but I’ve yet to see an example of an ODM completed where the recommended 
decision was taken and it blew up in our face” SM2. All interviewees stated that they believed that the 
ODM process has helped them to manage emerging issues better, and they have not experienced an 
ODM where it led to making a situation worse. One OM stated, “I’m quite satisfied [with the ODM 
process]. We’ve had very positive results from it. It doesn’t mean that very decision we would like to do is supported 
through this process. There’s been times where the decision is not to proceed” OM2. “It [ODM] is becoming part of 
our language. It appears to work well and has not led us to difficulty. It seems to help us deal with a broad range of 
issues” OM1 
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They all expressed that stopping to consult, and using a structured approach to decide a path 
forward, was of great value in dealing with the large variety of issues that are experienced at the plant.  
 
“One is always free to collaborate. Since the ODM process is really a formal collaboration tool as an antidote, 
or a preventative measure, to make sure we get out of knowledge mode cleanly. To reduce the probability of error 
from 1 in 2 to we hope something more like 1 in 1000. I don’t know what we are reducing to, but really like 
the collaborate concept for knowledge based mode. It gives you a multi discipline, you’ve got friends, who can all 
go in this together and talk it through, ensuring that we understand all the facets of a problems before we propose 
a solution” SM4. 
 
One interviewee summarised the ODM process as,  
 
“our obligation running the nuclear industry is to demonstrate we are making decisions that manage our margin 
and manage the level of risk that we are incurring. The ‘demonstrate’ has always meant to me in writing, fact 
based, auditable by an objective and knowledgeable third party. Demonstrate we thought about the risk. ODM 
leaves documentation about what we thought about” SM4.  
 
This description describes an important objective of nuclear power management very much in terms 
of the procedural based, written, control frameworks. However it also suggests that nuclear managers 
are thinking of the ODM process in that way also, as opposed to thinking of the ODM process as a 
means to think beyond their traditional framework. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The ODM process was chosen as a research topic to examine what nuclear managers do when they 
are faced with a situation for which they have no pre-determined procedure. This topic is of interest 
given that the nuclear power industry has significantly improved performance over the last 35 years 
using a philosophy of control. The control philosophy directs that most work within a nuclear facility 
is governed by pre-determined procedure. This approach to establishing safe operation has remained 
essentially unchanged over this period, even though the complexity of nuclear organisations has 
increased substantially. It has been suggested that the existing control approach may have reached its 
limits and that new ways of establishing safety are required to supplement the control approach. 
Inquiry into the ODM process therefore provides an opportunity to look closely at the region of 
activity for which the control philosophy has not defined an explicit response.  
 
The interview format chosen to study ODM was very successful in eliciting data that could be used 
to develop a rich description of the ODM process. Taking each interviewee through multiple passes 
of an actual event allowed the ‘as-lived’ experience of the ODM process to be revealed. For example, 
the first pass through an event tended to be a very technical description along with the interviewee 
emphasising the key steps of the ODM process as described in the official procedure. The second 
pass encouraged the interviewee to discuss what they were thinking during the subject event, and 
how they were approaching the problem. The third pass encouraged the interviewee to reflect upon 
the social interactions and the mood and nature of the discussions. The data from each interview was 
then arranged around the core process of ODM to develop an aggregate view of the overall process. 
This aggregate view provided much more depth in the cognitive and social environment of the 
process without the distraction of the technical facts of each individual scenario. Indeed, it appears 
that this approach is of value when studying situations much closer to routine, normal, operations 
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where the individual ‘stories’ of events may provide less insight than a consolidated picture of, for 
example, the overall ODM process. 
 
The ODM process provides a generic approach that can be applied to a range of plant issues. The 
process described by the ODM procedure is straightforward and is described by interviewees as 
simply stop and consult, when faced with a unique emerging condition of concern for which there is 
no pre-established procedure! The overall objective of the process is to generate explicit instructions 
(i.e. an ad-hoc procedure) to address the issue of concern. In this way an emerging issue is brought 
back under the umbrella of the closely controlled procedural driven environment expected by the 
overarching control paradigm. 
 
The ODM procedure instructs that a structured process be followed to determine a suitable path 
forward using a process of rational choice. This requires the identification and evaluation of credible 
options. A multi-disciplinary team enacts this process, and that team must have a designated ‘black-
hat’ who will help guard against ‘group-think’ and monitor standards. The procedure also specifies 
personal attributes that are deemed important for success of the process. It is expected that the 
procedure be followed at any time it is believed the ‘entry-conditions’ are met. This procedure thus 
follows the same form as any other procedure in the plant documentation hierarchy, where 
instructions and responsibilities are specified to meet specific goals. The expectation is that the 
process will deliver a suitable recommendation to the OM provided that the process steps are 
followed, and that each team member applies a high level of rigour. The ODM process thus appears 
to be established as another 'rational' process within the framework of control, much like another 
‘tool’ in the toolbox of the control regimen. This 'tool' is then used to address issues as they emerge.  
 
As such, the ODM process exhibits some characteristics that continue to reinforce and legitimate the 
control paradigm. The procedure continues with a reductionist (or analytic) approach by defining the 
team membership based on the expertise required to address the perceived issue at hand. This 
approach assumes that the boundary of the issue is known in advance. The team may, as a result, not 
have the expertise required to recognise the full meaning of the data being presented for a unique 
situation in the context of the broader socio-technical system. There is heavy emphasis throughout 
the procedure to ensure that data is ‘factual’. This establishes a hierarchy within the data that may 
eliminate useful information about the broader system. The ODM process relies on ‘verification’ to 
assure the quality of information being considered. Verification relies upon the expertise of the 
verifier and may be subject to limitations based on individual experience and the extent to which the 
system context is considered. The control paradigm characteristics described are key elements of 
traditional analytic problem solving and the ODM process is focussed on developing a rigorous plan 
to address the issue of concern. However, in the context of ODM in the complex environment of 
nuclear power operations, these characteristics may restrict the full appreciation of the data being 
presented within the system.  
 
The ODM process also exhibits characteristics that move away from that expected within a 
philosophy of control. It appears that organisational authority and the respect for expertise appear to 
be balanced by a more egalitarian environment which supports the expectation that anyone has a 
right to say what they think, and raise their concerns, regardless of their individual background and 
rank. The revelation and discussion of potentially diverse mental models contrasts with the paradigm 
of ‘control logics’ where it is expected that “design basis, technical specifications, procedures and 
rules maintain control” (Perin, 2005, p. 198). Participants talk about their concerns and ideas and the 
basis for them, which then allows others to probe and critique the ideas, or further lever the idea 
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within their own experience. Even though the ODM process still requires experienced participants to 
make judgements about the suitability and prudence of recommended courses of action, the ODM 
process provides a framework that encourages discourse and building of a common understanding 
about the issues at play. Diversity and respect for difference, the gathering of information, and the 
consideration of consequences, all support a stronger proactive response to emerging issues in a 
complex environment. 
 
However, the ODM process may still inhibit full discourse on an ODM issue due to the ODM 
meeting being seen as a forum where a choice is made between pre-determined options. A separate 
engineering evaluation process generally verifies facts and provides the options, and the emergence 
of any new information, or the suggestion of a new option during the ODM meeting, would 
generally result in a ‘time-out’ to have the option studied outside the meeting. It appears that the 
prevalent control structure within the organisation expects all activities to be in the right procedural 
‘box’. This in turn may inhibit some of the synergistic advantages of discussion in an ODM forum.  
 
The philosophy of control approach can be distilled to the maxim, ‘follow the procedure’. The ODM 
process is, paradoxically, implemented by procedure to be followed in the unique event there is no 
procedure to cover an emerging situation. The following of this procedure gives somewhat 
underspecified guidance to the plant managers. The process as described is very subjective and it still 
requires the application of experience and judgement to develop and analyse options, and judge the 
merits over one option over another. Ultimately a judgement is made if the recommended option 
itself is acceptable for implementation in the plant. As such, the ODM procedure is the one 
procedure that tries to move beyond the industry’s control regimen. It attempts to influence 
judgement in terms of its acknowledgement that ODM consists of both a process and a set of 
attributes employed by personnel. The attributes appear to urge the quality of personal interaction 
with the process by asking each person involved, for example, to have a questioning attitude, to 
freely express opinions and counterarguments, and, if in doubt then stop and ask. It appears that the 
procedure attempts to capture a complex social process in a technical format. When discussing this 
idea with one interviewee commented, “I hadn’t really thought of it that way, the way that procedure came 
through … but it’s pretty much technically driven padded with some ‘make it rigorous’” OM2. 
 
The acknowledgement that social factors may support good performance is difficult for a control 
paradigm. An assumption of the philosophy of control is that, “a peopled technology operating in 
the world is … a source of variability and instability to be minimized by maximising automation, 
standardization and training”(Perin, 2005, p. xii). In contrast the ODM process adds value by 
creating a social environment where experienced staff, with a mixture of expertise and background, 
can have a free and open discussion about the issue in question. To some extent, the ODM process 
is beginning to acknowledge and organise the real-time logics that front line managers use to address 
emerging issues. The process as designed works through the diligent application of a decision making 
process. The process as observed appears to add value by creation of a social environment which 
leverages experience and encourages sharing of ideas and concerns, and which in turn, engenders 
synergy between the participants to create a broader understanding of the issue, and a more 
comprehensive approach to address it.  
 
The philosophy of control in nuclear power has historically provided a strong basis for the 
improvement of safety in nuclear power. The ODM process was originated and implemented within 
this framework of control and, according to the participants, has improved the organisation’s 
response to emerging issues that may impact ongoing safe operation. On the other hand, artefacts 
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from the philosophy of control, as outlined in this thesis, also act to inhibit the full value that could 
be derived from the ODM process. It can be seen that the ODM process can be improved by 
enhancing the diversity of the ODM team, by clarifying the difference between discovery and 
verification, and by refining the role of the black-hat. This will then enable the full discovery of data 
associated with the system operation and the emerging issue of concern, and it will also allow 
discussion of the meanings associated with the data. This will, in turn, provide a more 
comprehensive input for the processes of rationalisation and verification. Ultimately the output of 
the ODM process must still be translated into instructions for operating staff.  Such instructions 
must be detailed, verified, and explicit so that operations staff responsible for the plant can maintain 
full control, and be fully aware of the safety constraints.  
 
As understanding of the ODM process is developed it will be interesting to consider how the control 
philosophy will adjust as managers become more experienced at using the ODM process. Currently 
the ODM process is used to fill procedural gaps in the control mechanisms. However, the focus and 
encouragement to use the ODM process to address emerging issues could also be seen as the 
addition of a new methodology to supplement the control philosophy. Rather than seeing an 
emerging issue as a challenge to the paradigm of control, the ODM process uses current information 
about the state of the system, along with a multi-disciplinary approach, to provide thoroughly 
prepared guidance to the system operators. This approach is already being used to respond to the 
on-going variations that are now acknowledged as part of managing a complex system. It appears 
that the social properties of the ODM process add features that help to cope with complexity in the 
socio-technical systems that now comprise nuclear power utilities.  
 
Limitations of Research and Ideas for Future Research 
 
This research was limited by the need to rely on interviewee descriptions of the ODM process, rather 
than relying on the actual observation of the ODM process in action. This research is also limited in 
that it provides a description of the social process around ODM, and discusses the value of the 
elements identified, but it does not discuss in any detail why the various elements exist.  
 
This research has identified that there is value in taking a close look at activities that are perceived to 
be closer to routine daily work for key utility staff. But the focus on ODM has also established a 
category of events that are quasi-abnormal, and as such could still be considered non-routine.  
 
The ODM process is one of many problem-solving processes that could be activated by utility staff 
to address emerging issues. The engineering evaluation process was mentioned in this thesis, but was 
not described in any detail, nor was any elaboration made of the social processes that surround that 
process. It would be worthwhile to study the interaction of processes such as engineering evaluation, 
troubleshooting, and investigations, to build a greater depth of understanding of how the processes 
interact and function in reality, and to better understand how rationality is established within the 
plethora of data being studied. 
 
It is also noted that the ODM procedure entry conditions restrict use of the process to issues with 
plant equipment. Interviewees confirmed that the process has not been used to address non-
technical issues. A different process, study of which was outside the scope of this research, is used to 
addresses organisation changes. However it raises a possible question for future research regarding 
the socio-technical nature of a large safety critical endeavour, and how the issues are 
compartmentalised between 'technical' and 'organisational'. 
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This research has looked at the implementation of ODM at one Canadian utility. There was no 
attempt made to characterise the national, social or business culture in this utility and how that may 
influence the decision-making processes within the organisation. It would be worthwhile to repeat 
this work in other countries, and in a broader range of organisations, to help build a deeper 
understanding of how social decision making processes contribute to the construction of safety. 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
Interviewees were contacted individually prior to the interview date and were given a short 
description of the research and the description of the consent process. Each interviewee was asked 
to bring to mind two or three recent ODM events in which they were involved, and which they 
believe were challenging. As part of the interview structure each interviewee was asked to refer to a 
specific event to help provide a framework for discussing the ODM process.  
 
 
The semi-structured interview was organised in four parts 
 
1.0 Introduction. 
1. Brief summary of the research to the informant. 
2. Explanation of the informed consent process and signing the consent form. 
3. Ask the interviewee for a brief summary of his/her education, years of experience within 
nuclear power, and career path in the nuclear industry. 
 
2.0 Event identification. 
1. Ask the interviewee to summarise a recent ODM event of interest. 
2. The interview focussed the informant on the event in more detail. An exact timeline was not 
critical, but a general order of the steps through the event from the decision to initiate the 
ODM process, to the point were further action was not deemed necessary. The informant 
was prompted to identify who was involved, key players and key discussions (Crandall et al., 
2006). 
 
3.0 Event probes. 
1. The researcher stepped through the event again and asked the informant to elaborate on key 
parts of this ODM event. The questions “[were] aimed at eliciting the cues and information 
available in the situation, the meaning they held for the participant, and the specific cognitive 
processes they evoked” (Crandall et al., 2006, p. 79). The questions used depended on the 
story being told by the interviewee, but example questions included: 
 
i. What were your specific goals and objectives at the time? 
ii. Is it a type of event you were trained to deal with? 
iii. Were you reminded of any previous experience? 
iv. What information did you use in making this decision? 
v. How was an option chosen or others rejected? 
vi. Did you imagine the possible consequences of this action? (Crandall et al., 
2006, p. 79) 
 
2. The researcher asked additional questions about the social interactions that occurred. For 
example; 
a. What was the mood or atmosphere of the ODM meeting? 
b. Was everyone at the ODM meeting involved in the discussion? 
c. Are you aware of a situation where a specialist in one area raised an issue in another 
area? 
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d. Were any issues raised that initially sounded completely ‘off-the-wall’? 
e. Did any individual identify a brand new issue during a group discussion that had not 
been previously foreseen? 
f. Did anyone raise an issue based on ‘gut-feel’? If so how did the team/organisation 
respond? 
 
 
4.0 Interview closing. 
1. Based on our discussion, is there anything else that springs to mind you would like to tell me? 
2. Thank the informant for their time and involvement in the project. Remind them of my 
contact information and ask their permission to contact them should I need to ask a follow 
up question. 
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